On the ease of (dis)believing: The role of accessibility experiences in credibility judgments by Ask, Karl et al.
Running head: ACCESSIBILITY EXPERIENCES AND CREDIBILITY 1 
 
 
Please cite as: Ask, K., Greifeneder, R., & Reinhard, M.-A. (2012). On the ease of 
(dis)believing: The role of accessibility experiences in credibility judgments. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 26, 779-784. doi: 10.1002/acp.2859 
 
 
On the Ease of (Dis)believing:  
The Role of Accessibility Experiences in Credibility Judgments 
 
Karl Ask1, Rainer Greifeneder2,3, and Marc-André Reinhard3 
1University of Gothenburg, Sweden 
2Zeppelin University, Germany 
3University of Mannheim, Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
Author note 
Karl Ask, Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg; Rainer Greifeneder, 
Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen and Department of Microsociology and Social 
Psychology, University of Mannheim; Marc-André Reinhard, Department of Social 
Psychology, University of Mannheim. 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Karl Ask, Department 
of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, P.O. Box 500, SE 405 30  Gothenburg, Sweden. 
E-mail: karl.ask@psy.gu.se
ACCESSIBILITY EXPERIENCES AND CREDIBILITY 2 
Abstract 
Credibility judgments are common and consequential in many applied settings. While much 
research has addressed human observers’ ability to discriminate true and deceptive 
statements, less is known about the processes involved in such judgments. Here, it is proposed 
that the process of mustering evidence for or against credibility is reflected in a feeling-based 
form (ease-of-retrieval), and that such feelings can be used as a basis for credibility 
judgments. The results of an experiment show, as predicted, that the perceived ease with 
which participants could identify clues strongly influenced credibility judgments. Ironically, 
mustering more clues in support of a truthful account lowered credibility judgments; in 
contrast, mustering more clues in support of a deceptive account increased credibility 
judgments. Mediation analyses suggest that this is because participants relied on a feeling-
based as opposed to content-based judgment strategy. Practical implications are discussed, 
and theoretical issues regarding the process of credibility judgment are raised. 
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On the Ease of (Dis)believing:  
The Role of Accessibility Experiences in Credibility Judgments 
Credibility judgments are made on a daily basis in many applied settings, including the 
legal, business, medical, and political domains. Consider, for instance, a staff manager who 
makes hiring decisions based on information provided by job applicants. Because it is in the 
interest of the applicant to present him- or herself in a favorable light, the staff manager needs 
to judge whether the provided information represents the truth or is in fact an attempt to 
deceive. Moreover, credibility judgments often need to be backed up with supporting 
arguments. In many jurisdictions, for example, judges in criminal trials must give reasons for 
why a particular witness is deemed credible or not. These examples illustrate the 
consequential nature of credibility judgments, but also put the finger on an often neglected 
aspect of credibility assessments—the process of generating supporting arguments. Drawing 
on social-cognitive research on ”accessibility experiences,” we argue that the process of 
generating arguments per se may influence the perception of credibility. Specifically, the 
number (i.e., few vs. many) and type (e.g., for vs. against credibility) of reasons to be 
generated may systematically bias judgments, by influencing the perceived ease with which 
reasons come to mind. In the current paper, we present an experiment testing this possibility. 
The Process of Credibility Attribution  
The past few decades have witnessed a surge of research on human observers’ ability 
to detect deception (for a review, see Vrij, 2008). This research has led to rather disappointing 
conclusions. When presented with true and deceptive statements, people distinguish these 
with an accuracy barely exceeding chance level (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). The process of 
veracity judgments or credibility attribution has been investigated from different theoretical 
perspectives (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; 
Levine, Kim, & Blair, 2010; Levine & McCornack, 2001; Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999; 
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O’Sullivan, 2003; Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2009; Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 
2008, 2010; Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, Marksteiner, 2011). For instance, while some 
researchers have used basic assumptions of dual-process models (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999; 
Petty & Wegener, 1999) to explain the process of lie detection (Forrest, Feldman, & Tyler, 
2004; Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2009; Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010), 
others have approached the topic from the viewpoint of attribution theory (O'Sullivan, 2003), 
investigated sender characteristics (Levine, Kim, & Blair, 2010; Levine & McCornack, 2001; 
Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999), or focused on situational factors that moderate cue usage 
in deception judgments (Reinhard, Scharmach, & Sporer, 2012; Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, 
& Marksteiner, 2011; Stiff et al., 1989). 
The most frequent source of information about the credibility attribution process, 
however, is people’s self-reported lie-detection strategies. In a typical lie-detection 
experiment, participants are asked to report which information they used to arrive at their final 
judgment (Vrij, 2008). Moreover, numerous surveys have been conducted where people are 
asked to report to what extent they believe different behavioral cues are indicative of 
deception (e.g., Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Global Deception Research Team, 
2006; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). Implicit in such requests is the assumption that 
credibility judgments are the products of a deliberate integration of reasons favoring and 
opposing credibility. A recent series of meta-analyses by Hartwig and Bond (2011), however, 
suggests that people have limited insight into the actual processes underlying their credibility 
judgments, in line with what has been found for many other social judgments (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). Credibility inferences, thus, appear to involve implicit processes that have 
only recently started to be explored (Albrechtsen, Meissner, & Susa, 2009; Ask & Reinhard, 
2012). Moreover, despite the frequent use of self-report methods, it is worth noting that 
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merely requiring participants to provide self-reports may alter their perception of credibility. 
To explain how, we now turn to the literature on accessibility experiences. 
Accessibility Experiences 
Stylized in the notion of a “Homo economicus,” sound judgments and decisions were 
long thought to be based on content information, such as arguments in favor or against a 
specific position. Over the last three decades, however, researchers in social cognition have 
marshaled strong evidence showing that judgments may also be formed on the basis of 
feelings (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). For instance, Schwarz and colleagues (1991) reported that 
the experienced ease or difficulty with which examples of one’s own assertive behavior can 
be retrieved from memory influences judgments about the self. Relatedly, Wänke, Bohner, 
and Jurkowitsch (1997) showed that ease or difficulty associated with generating reasons in 
favor of a certain brand influences liking. It is by now well established that such feelings of 
ease or difficulty constitute an independent source of information that individuals may use in 
addition to, or instead of, content information to form judgments (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 
2007). Such feelings are referred to as “cognitive feelings,” because they are associated with 
cognitive processing, but are felt much like affective or bodily feelings (Clore, 1992). 
One cognitive feeling that figures particularly prominently is the experience of ease or 
difficulty when retrieving content information from memory, generally referred to as ease-of-
retrieval or accessibility experiences (Schwarz et al., 1991; for reviews, see Schwarz, 1998, 
2004). Research on accessibility experiences originated in the realm of frequency judgments, 
where researchers observed that a class of objects is judged to be more common the more 
easily according examples can be retrieved from memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Since then, accessibility experiences have been shown to influence many other types of 
judgments. For example, self-judgments (e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 2008; Schwarz, et al., 
1991) are more positive the more easily positive self- or other-relevant information can be 
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retrieved. Similarly, evaluations of objects have been shown to reflect the ease or difficulty 
with which information can be brought to mind (e.g., Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & 
Simonson, 2007). Even abstract concepts, such as attitude strength (Haddock, Rothman, 
Reber, & Schwarz, 1999), memory performance (e.g., Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli, 1998), 
and trust (Greifeneder, Müller, Stahlberg, van den Bos, & Bless, 2011), are influenced by 
accessibility experiences. 
To date, however, research has not investigated the role of accessibility experiences in 
judgments of credibility. This is surprising, as cognitive feelings have been suggested to be a 
generally valid source of information on which individuals frequently rely (Greifeneder, 
Bless, & Pham, 2011). Moreover, because credibility judgments in applied settings are often 
associated with the generation of supporting arguments, knowledge about the role of 
accessibility experiences in this domain is of obvious practical relevance. The present 
research was designed to address this lack of research.  
The Present Research 
Participants in our study were presented with a videotaped account in a job interview 
setting. Before judging the credibility of the job applicant, they were asked to list few or many 
clues indicating that the applicant had given a truthful or deceptive account. Because recalling 
many clues is experienced as difficult, participants may conclude that there are not many 
clues available—why else would it be so difficult to name these? Conversely, because 
recalling few clues is experienced as easy, participants may infer that there are many clues 
available—why else would it be so easy to come up with exemplars? Thus, we predicted that 
participants generating many (vs. few) truth clues would perceive the target as less credible, 
because they would find it more difficult to come up with reasons to believe the statement. 
Following the same logic, we predicted that participants recalling many (vs. few) lie clues 
would perceive the target as more credible, because they would find it more difficult to come 
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up with reasons to disbelieve the statement. Note that this pattern of results is diametrically 
opposed to what would be expected if participants relied on a content-based judgment 
strategy, in which case recalling more information would yield judgments more in line with 
(and not opposite to) the recalled content. The few-versus-many recall paradigm was 
introduced by Schwarz and colleagues (1991) and has since been used as the standard 
manipulation in ease-of-retrieval research (for a recent discussion of the paradigm’s validity, 
see Wänke, in press). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Eighty-seven students at the University of Mannheim (38 females; Mage = 22.6 years) 
participated in the experiment on a paid voluntary basis. Participants were randomly assigned 
to conditions specified by a 2 (number of clues: few vs. many) × 2 (type of clues: truth vs. lie) 
× 2 (video content: truth vs. lie) factorial design. Three participants expressed suspicion about 
the true purpose of the experiment and were excluded from analyses. 
Procedure and Materials 
Upon arrival, participants received written instructions for the experiment. They were 
told that they would watch a video recording of a job interview, and that the applicant would 
talk about a previous internship. Participants were asked to assume the role of the recruiter. 
Moreover, participants were told that it is equally likely that the applicant is telling the truth 
(i.e., talking about an actual internship) as it is likely that he is lying (i.e., talking about a 
fictitious internship). The video recording was then presented on a laptop computer. 
Video material. The video material was originally developed for a study on lie 
detection (Reinhard, Greifeneder, & Scharmach, 2012). Eight male students of economic 
sciences, aged 22–29 years, posed as stimulus persons on the video recordings.  The students 
had been asked to recount in front of a digital video camera (a) their most recent internship 
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and (b) one fictitious, randomly assigned internship. Stimulus persons were given 5 minutes 
to prepare before the recording, and were asked to base their stories on three questions 
(“When, where, and for whom did you do your internship?”, “What exactly did you do in the 
internship?”, and “What did you like/dislike about the internship?”). The resulting 16 
accounts were detailed and comprehensive (M = 228 s, SD = 37). 
For the current experiment, eight accounts—four truthful and four deceptive—were 
selected; each stimulus person was featured once. Participants were shown a randomly 
selected truthful or deceptive account, depending on experimental condition. 
Manipulation of accessibility experiences. Immediately after participants had 
watched the video recording, accessibility experiences were manipulated. Participants in the 
truth clues condition were instructed to write down two or six clues indicating that the job 
applicant had told the truth about the reported internship. Participants in the lie clues 
condition were instructed to identify two or six clues indicating that the job applicant had lied 
about the reported internship. A pretest (N = 30) using the manipulation check items of the 
present study (see below) had indicated that generating two clues for truth/deception was 
perceived as relatively easy (M = 5.35), whereas generating six clues was perceived as 
relatively difficult (M = 3.02), t(28) = 3.83, p < .001. 
Manipulation check. As a manipulation check for accessibility experiences, 
participants were asked “How difficult or easy was it to list the clues?”, “How difficult or 
easy would it have been to mention additional clues?”, and “How difficult or easy was it to 
come up with the last clue?” Answers were given on 9-point rating scales (1 = very difficult, 
9 = very easy). The three items were averaged to form a single index variable (Cronbach’s 
α = .88). 
Credibility judgments. Participants then rated the perceived credibility of the job 
applicant, by indicating their agreement with two statements: “As staff manager I would 
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doubt the applicant’s account of the internship” and “As staff manager I would fully trust the 
applicant’s account of the internship.” Ratings were made on scales from 1 (disagree) to 9 
(agree). The first item was reverse-scored and averaged with the second item to create a 
credibility index variable (α = .92). 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
The index variable representing accessibility experiences was entered in a 2 (number 
of clues: few vs. many) × 2 (type of clues: truth vs. lie) × 2 (video content: truth vs. lie) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). As expected, generating few clues (M = 5.08, SD = 2.21) was 
experienced as easier than generating many clues (M = 3.29, SD = 1.77), F(1, 76) = 16.78, 
p < .001, η2p = .18. No other main or interaction effects were significant.1 
Credibility Judgments 
A 2 (number of clues: few vs. many) × 2 (type of clues: truth vs. lie) × 2 (video 
content: truth vs. lie) ANOVA was performed on the credibility index. As predicted, the 
Number of Clues × Type of Clues interaction was significant, F(1, 76) = 9.07, p = .003, 
η2p = .11. The interaction is illustrated in Figure 1. In the lie clues condition, participants 
judged the target as more credible when asked to generate many (M = 5.13, SD = 2.28) as 
opposed to few (M = 3.66, SD = 2.26) clues, F(1, 76) = 4.71, p = .033, η2p = .06; presumably, 
this is because they relied on perceived ease or difficulty and not on the content of the recalled 
clues. Conversely, in the truth clues condition, participants judged the target as less credible 
when asked to generate many (M = 3.50, SD = 1.66) as opposed to few (M = 4.93, SD = 2.35) 
clues, F(1, 76) = 4.39, p = .039, η2p = .05; again, presumably reflecting a feeling-based 
judgment strategy. Moreover, when asked to generate many clues, participants generating lie 
clues judged the target as more credible than did participants generating truth clues, 
F(1, 76) = 5.19, p = .025, η2p = .06. In contrast, when asked to generate few clues, participants 
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generating lie clues judged the target as marginally less credible than did participants 
generating truth clues, F(1, 76) = 3.91, p = .052, η2p = .05. No other main effects or 
interactions were significant in the omnibus analysis, all Fs < 1. 
Mediation Analysis 
Additional analyses were performed to further explore the role of accessibility 
experiences in credibility judgments. As expected, the perceived ease of generating clues was 
positively correlated with credibility judgments in the truth clues condition, r = .41, p = .007, 
and negatively correlated with credibility judgments in the lie clues condition, r = -.70, 
p < .001. A series of regression analyses further supported the mediating role of accessibility 
experiences. First, replicating the main analyses, a Number of Clues × Type of Clues 
interaction contrast significantly predicted credibility judgments, B = 0.72, SE = 0.23, 
p = .003.2 Second, the interaction contrast significantly predicted accessibility experiences, 
B = -0.41, SE = 0.10, p < .001.3  Third, accessibility experiences significantly predicted 
credibility judgments, B = -1.19, SE = 0.22, p < .001. Finally, when controlling for 
accessibility experiences, the Number of Clues × Type of Clues interaction effect on 
credibility judgments dropped to non-significance, B = 0.24, SE = 0.22, p = .292, indicating 
that the interaction was fully mediated by accessibility experiences. The mediation was 
confirmed by a significant Sobel test, z = 3.19, p = .001. 
Discussion 
The present study was designed to investigate the role of accessibility experiences in 
judgments of credibility. We found, as predicted, that the felt ease with which clues in support 
of a specific position could be mustered influenced the perception of credibility. Importantly, 
it was not the actual content of the generated clues that influenced judgments; if this were the 
case, mustering more evidence in support of a specific position would have shifted judgments 
in the corresponding direction. Instead, mustering more evidence in support of a specific 
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position shifted judgments in the direction opposite of the recalled content information. 
Similarly, this pattern of results is diametrically opposed to what would be expected if 
increased time spent ruminating on specific clues were to produce directionally more 
consistent judgments, as would be predicted from information integration theory (Anderson, 
1981) and from research on the effects of time and thought on the formation of attitudes 
(Tesser & Conlee, 1975). Arguably, it took our participants longer to generate six as opposed 
to two clues, but judgments were nonetheless more consistent with the clues generated in the 
latter condition. Instead, in line with the logic of Schwarz and colleagues’ (1991) ease-of-
retrieval paradigm, our pattern of results suggests that individuals recruited feelings of ease or 
difficulty associated with the process of generating clues as direct input to credibility 
judgments. The present evidence, thus, stands in contrast to the implicit assumption that 
people arrive at credibility judgments by weighing and integrating cues in a deliberative 
fashion. 
In professional settings, where credibility judgments are routinely backed up by 
supporting arguments (e.g., in court, prosecutorial decision making), the precise nature of the 
argument generation process may have significant consequences for the resulting judgments. 
For instance, if a judge focuses selectively on support for either truth or deception, any extra-
legal factor that influences the perceived ease or difficulty of generating such support may 
have a profound biasing impact. If, in contrast, there are incentives to focus on support for 
both positions, the perception of both alternatives should be equally influenced by 
accessibility experiences, thus canceling out any bias. The implications may be even greater 
in the context of criminal investigations, which are typically carried out under strong 
institutional time pressure (Ask & Alison, 2010). Social-cognitive research has shown that the 
impact of accessibility experiences is more pronounced in conditions of high (vs. low) time 
pressure (Greifeneder & Bless, 2007). Moreover, perceived time pressure greatly reduces 
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criminal investigators’ ability to entertain multiple hypotheses, and exacerbates the tendency 
to focus on support for a single hypothesis (Ask & Granhag, 2007). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that investigators focusing selectively on the guilt of a particular suspect, or 
the credibility of a specific witness, are particularly likely to have their judgments influenced 
by factors related to the ease or difficulty of retrieval. 
A question with great relevance for the deception detection literature concerns the 
validity of accessibility experiences. In our experiment, accessibility experiences and truth 
status of the judged accounts were manipulated orthogonally, so that perceived ease was 
rendered non-diagnostic of actual truth or deception. In real life, however, accessibility 
experiences may serve as a useful indicator as to the veracity of a statement. In other settings, 
cognitive feelings have been suggested to be a generally valid source of information 
(Greifeneder, Bless, & Scholl, in press; Herzog & Hertwig, in press), since experiences of 
ease or difficulty often reliably reflect actual frequencies in the environment. When ease-of-
retrieval experiences lead astray in scientific experiments (as in the current study), it is 
because researchers devise methods producing error to demonstrate underlying psychological 
processes, much in the same way as researchers create optical illusions as a means to 
elucidate perceptual processes. Experimentally induced biases, thus, are not indicative of the 
potential for ecologically valid inferences. At present, there is only limited empirical evidence 
concerning the validity of cognitive feelings in relation to credibility judgments. In a meta-
analysis, DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, and Muhlenbruck (1997) found that, although 
increased confidence was not associated with more accurate deception judgments, people 
tended to be more confident when judging true as opposed to deceptive accounts; that is, 
people expressed greater certainty in their judgments of actual truths (vs. lies), independently 
of whether or not they correctly identified them as true. Moreover, Reinhard, Sporer, and 
Scharmach (in press) recently found that confidence and lie detection accuracy were better 
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calibrated when judges felt highly familiar (vs. unfamiliar) with the judgment situation. This 
suggests that meta-cognitive experiences (e.g., confidence, accessibility experiences) may be 
valid indicators of truth and deception. We believe this is a possibility worth exploring in 
future research. 
The current findings also raise important questions regarding the process of veracity 
judgments. Our manipulation checks indicate that generating reasons in support of veracity 
judgments may be a difficult task per se; participants asked to generate only two reasons 
barely reached the midpoint of the difficult–easy rating scale. Possibly, this is because 
argument generation is not the default mode of judgment formation, but rather a secondary, 
effortful process that may override spontaneous, global impressions (see Uleman, Saribay, & 
Gonzalez, 2008). Indeed, recent meta-analytic findings show that actual credibility judgments 
are largely determined by observers’ global impression of the judgment target (e.g., 
ambivalent, competent, cooperative), and that some specific cues that people frequently 
mention when reporting cues to deception (e.g., lack of eye contact, fidgeting) are in fact only 
weakly related to perceived credibility (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). The relative contribution of 
spontaneous impressions and deliberate processes probably depends on the precise nature of 
the judgment task, varying along dimensions such as accountability, perceived importance of 
the judgment, availability of content cues, and the observer’s ability and motivation to engage 
in effortful deliberation. Consistent with this assumption, Ask and Reinhard (2012) recently 
found that people low in the need for cognition (see Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) based their 
credibility judgments on their current inclination to approach or avoid the target person, 
whereas people high in need for cognition were unaffected by their approach/avoidance state. 
Finally, a possible limitation of the current research should be mentioned. In 
generalizing the current findings to applied settings, one must consider whether professionals 
assessing veracity on a regular basis would display the same pattern as the student participants 
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did in our study. It could be argued that formal training and established guidelines serve to 
minimize the role of subjective feelings in judgments. In the case of credibility judgments, 
however, there is little to suggest that this should be the case. In fact, there are few formalized 
procedures for assessing credibility, and those that do exist (e.g., Statement Validity 
Assessment, Reality Monitoring; Vrij, 2008) are laborious and therefore rarely used. 
Moreover, survey findings show that professionals, at least in the legal domain, hold beliefs 
about cues to deception similar to those reported by lay people (Akehurst, et al., 1996; 
Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). Hence, it seems probable that our findings would replicate in a 
professional sample. Perhaps more critical from an applied perspective is the extent to which 
our findings would generalize to other types of lies than the one studied here. When assessing 
a defendant’s credibility, for instance, jurors and judges typically have access to a fuller body 
of background knowledge (e.g., witness statements, physical evidence) against which the 
defendant’s statement can be gauged. This provides a richer repertoire of clues that can be 
recruited in support of lie or truth judgments. It is unclear whether a larger available 
information base would attenuate the ease-of-retrieval effect (because it is always easy to 
come up with clues) or create greater latitude for such an effect to take place (because the 
potential span between few and many clues is increased). Hence, it remains important to 
investigate the applicability of the current findings in naturalistic settings. 
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Footnotes 
1Unexpectedly, the three-way Number of Clues × Type of Clues × Video Content 
interaction approached significance, F(1, 76) = 3.22, p = .077, η2p = .04; the difference in ease 
of generating many versus few clues was slightly, but not significantly, smaller for 
participants who watched an actually deceptive video and generated truth clues, compared 
with participants who watched an actually truthful video or were asked to generate lie clues. 
No other interaction or main effect approached significance, ps > .33. 
2Consistent with the predicted pattern of means, the interaction contrast was coded as 
follows: few truth clues (+1), many truth clues (-1), few lie clues (-1), many lie clues (+1). 
3Because perceived ease was related to credibility judgments in opposite directions in 
the lie clues and truth clues conditions, the accessibility experiences index was reverse scored 
in the latter condition. 
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Figure 1. Ratings of target credibility as a function of type and number of clues generated 
(means and standard errors). 
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